Economics of Overloading and the Effect of Weight Enforcement: Research Note
James G. Strathman
Abstract
Open-access reader
James G. Strathman
Abstract
Open-access reader
This note describes the economic rationale for exceeding weight limits by motor carriers in the face of weight enforcement activities. Patterns of weight enforcement practices by states are identified reflecting differences in enforcement intensity and the severity of penalties imposed for exceeding weight limits. Statistical analysis of weight enforcement data shows that the marginal effects of enforcement intensity and penalties are similar in deterring overloading, with most of the enforcement-related deterrence attributable to the use of portable/semi-portable scales.
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This note describes the economic rationale for exceeding weight limits by motor carriers in the face of weight enforcement activities. Patterns of weight enforcement practices by states are identified reflecting differences in enforcement intensity and the severity of penalties imposed for exceeding weight limits. Statistical analysis of weight enforcement data shows that the marginal effects of enforcement intensity and penalties are similar in deterring overloading, with most of the enforcement-related deterrence attributable to the use of portable/semi-portable scales.
Key concepts: Enforcement, Economics, Political science, Law