An Elected Senate for Canada? The Australian Model
Brian Galligan
Abstract
Brian Galligan
Abstract
One proposal in the current debate over Senate reform in Canada is the adoption of a powerful Australian-style Senate. This has been advocated by a Canada West Foundation task force as a means of enhancing regional representation in Canada. It is argued that there is much that Canada can learn from Australia’s experience with an elected Senate. Four major issues are discussed. The first is that with a voting system of proponional representation the governing party would be unlikely to control the Senate and as a result national government would be weakened. Secondly, it is argued that combining the two institutions of responsible government and an elected Senate with full legislative powers is incompatible in principle and prone to constitutional breakdowns as happened in Australia in 1975. Thirdly, recommendations for ensuring the independence of the Senate are evaluated against current Australian proposals. Fourthly, proposals for tying Senate terms to those of the Commons, while leaving the prime minister with the discretion to call early elections, produce a high level of insecurity in the system. In short the article warns against the adoption by Canada of an Australian-style elected Senate.
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One proposal in the current debate over Senate reform in Canada is the adoption of a powerful Australian-style Senate. This has been advocated by a Canada West Foundation task force as a means of enhancing regional representation in Canada. It is argued that there is much that Canada can learn from Australia’s experience with an elected Senate. Four major issues are discussed. The first is that with a voting system of proponional representation the governing party would be unlikely to control the Senate and as a result national government would be weakened. Secondly, it is argued that combining the two institutions of responsible government and an elected Senate with full legislative powers is incompatible in principle and prone to constitutional breakdowns as happened in Australia in 1975. Thirdly, recommendations for ensuring the independence of the Senate are evaluated against current Australian proposals. Fourthly, proposals for tying Senate terms to those of the Commons, while leaving the prime minister with the discretion to call early elections, produce a high level of insecurity in the system. In short the article warns against the adoption by Canada of an Australian-style elected Senate.
Key concepts: House of Commons, Legislature, Political science, Government (linguistics), Law, Voting, Public administration, Independence (probability theory)