US Armed Forces Information Operations - Is the Doctrine Adequate
Charles N. Eassa
Abstract
Charles N. Eassa
Abstract
The integration of Information Operations into the United States Armed Forces has touched every aspect and level of military operations. This paper seeks to answer whether joint and service Information Operations doctrine is adequate. Ultimately, all military operations function on information. This requires an active thought process to protect the needed information and information systems as well as to exploit adversaries’ information requirements. The sister services have pursued approaches in developing and resourcing Information Operations based upon their tactical requirements. Outlining the joint and service doctrines, this monograph suggests that doctrine at the operational and strategic level is a collusion of service tactical doctrine and is too broad in its guidance. The doctrine does not specify responsibilities at the operational or strategic levels nor does it afford for synergy based on the services’ Information Operations doctrine. The study concludes that the doctrine represent a solid point of departure to continue the refinement and delineation of Information Operations at the operational and strategic levels.
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The integration of Information Operations into the United States Armed Forces has touched every aspect and level of military operations. This paper seeks to answer whether joint and service Information Operations doctrine is adequate. Ultimately, all military operations function on information. This requires an active thought process to protect the needed information and information systems as well as to exploit adversaries’ information requirements. The sister services have pursued approaches in developing and resourcing Information Operations based upon their tactical requirements. Outlining the joint and service doctrines, this monograph suggests that doctrine at the operational and strategic level is a collusion of service tactical doctrine and is too broad in its guidance. The doctrine does not specify responsibilities at the operational or strategic levels nor does it afford for synergy based on the services’ Information Operations doctrine. The study concludes that the doctrine represent a solid point of departure to continue the refinement and delineation of Information Operations at the operational and strategic levels.
Key concepts: Doctrine, Military doctrine, Computer science, Aeronautics, Operations research, Computer security, Business, Operations management