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2018•The Geneva Risk and Insurance ReviewOpen access

On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard

Pierre Martinon, Pierre Picard, Anasuya Raj

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Key concepts: Moral hazard, Deductible, Actuarial science, Ex-ante, Incentive compatibility, Incentive, Information asymmetry, Adverse selection

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