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1988•Artha Vijnana Journal of The Gokhale Institute of Politics and EconomicsRequires access

Risk Aversion and the Proportional Solution in Two Person Bargaining Games

Somdeb Lahiri

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Abstract

For bargaining over the distribution of commodities or other riskiness outcomes, Nash's, solution predicts that risk aversion is a disadvantage in bargaining.

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What this paper is about

For bargaining over the distribution of commodities or other riskiness outcomes, Nash's, solution predicts that risk aversion is a disadvantage in bargaining.

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Available abstract

For bargaining over the distribution of commodities or other riskiness outcomes, Nash's, solution predicts that risk aversion is a disadvantage in bargaining.

Key concepts: Bargaining problem, Risk aversion (psychology), Economics, Disadvantage, Microeconomics, Distribution (mathematics), Bargaining power, Inequity aversion

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