2008Unpublished venueRequires access

Signaling Game Analysis on Phenomena of Counterfeit Commodity

Fangyuan Lu, Bingxian Qiu

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

Analyzing selecting action of strategy in interaction between the supplier and the purchasers in market with the signaling game theory. Using refining Bayesian balance of signaling Game: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium studied the phenomenon of counterfeit commodity, comparing the benefit of genuine and counterfeit commodity, the camouflage cost of counterfeit commodity which is too small is the important factor of counterfeit commodity in flood. The result shows that if the information between suppliers and purchasers is unable to be transferred effectively, the counterfeit commodity emerge inevitably; Establishing and improving management system in market, increasing the protective efforts to enterprises which produce the genuine, enhancing income level of low-income groups, eliminating demand market of counterfeit commodity, are all the important ways to eliminate counterfeit commodity.

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What this paper is about

Analyzing selecting action of strategy in interaction between the supplier and the purchasers in market with the signaling game theory. Using refining Bayesian balance of signaling Game: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium studied the phenomenon of counterfeit commodity, comparing the benefit of genuine and counterfeit commodity, the camouflage cost of counterfeit commodity which is too small is the important factor of counterfeit commodity in flood. The result shows that if the information between suppliers and purchasers is unable to be transferred effectively, the counterfeit commodity emerge inevitably; Establishing and improving management system in market, increasing the protective efforts to enterprises which produce the genuine, enhancing income level of low-income groups, eliminating demand market of counterfeit commodity, are all the important ways to eliminate counterfeit commodity.

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Available abstract

Analyzing selecting action of strategy in interaction between the supplier and the purchasers in market with the signaling game theory. Using refining Bayesian balance of signaling Game: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium studied the phenomenon of counterfeit commodity, comparing the benefit of genuine and counterfeit commodity, the camouflage cost of counterfeit commodity which is too small is the important factor of counterfeit commodity in flood. The result shows that if the information between suppliers and purchasers is unable to be transferred effectively, the counterfeit commodity emerge inevitably; Establishing and improving management system in market, increasing the protective efforts to enterprises which produce the genuine, enhancing income level of low-income groups, eliminating demand market of counterfeit commodity, are all the important ways to eliminate counterfeit commodity.

Key concepts: Counterfeit, Commodity, Game theory, Business, Commodity market, Commerce, Economics, Industrial organization

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