Freedom of Religious Organizations

Religious freedom is now widely accepted as fundamental to any liberal democracy. It is recognized in domestic, regional and international human rights instruments and its importance is lauded by philosophers, lawyers, judges, clergy, and even politicians. While it is easy to support religious freedom in the abstract, tensions can arise between the activities of religious organizations and the law that challenge this general commitment to religious freedom. Should religious organizations be permitted to discriminate against women or gay people in their employment practices, when admitting members, or in providing goods and services? Should the courts interfere in these organizations to protect the interests of a disaffected member or to resolve internal property disputes? Should the state allow religious tribunals to determine or advise on family matters? A general commitment to religious freedom tells us little about how it ought to operate in a wide range of situations. It tells us even less about how it ought to apply where it conflicts with other commitments of the liberal state. This book fills this gap by considering when English law ought to apply to religious organizations. It does this by exploring certain potential conflicts between the law and religious organizations, examining whether the current British response to these conflicts is justified, and then suggesting an approach for dealing with such conflicts.