experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games
Charles R. Plott, Dean V. Williamson
Abstract
Charles R. Plott, Dean V. Williamson
Abstract
Summary. The research explores the relationship between games and the eco nomic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market con verges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilib rium.
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Summary. The research explores the relationship between games and the eco nomic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market con verges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilib rium.
Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Market game, Equilibrium selection, Convergence (economics), Economics, Solution concept, Mathematical economics, Best response