2000Unpublished venueRequires access

experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games

Charles R. Plott, Dean V. Williamson

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Abstract

Summary. The research explores the relationship between games and the eco nomic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market con verges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilib rium.

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What this paper is about

Summary. The research explores the relationship between games and the eco nomic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market con verges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilib rium.

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Available abstract

Summary. The research explores the relationship between games and the eco nomic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market con verges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilib rium.

Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Market game, Equilibrium selection, Convergence (economics), Economics, Solution concept, Mathematical economics, Best response

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