New Approach to Overcoming the Insurmountable Watershed Rule Exception to Teague's Collateral Review Killer, A
Ezra D. Landes
Abstract
Open-access reader
Ezra D. Landes
Abstract
Open-access reader
This Article will propose a new approach to overcoming the seemingly insurmountable watershed rule exception. While a single case - such as Crawford or Blakely - may not rise to watershed status, this Article will suggest that a line of cases could be considered watershed. 8 It will be shown that the highly subjective nature of this exception lends itself perfectly to this type of reasoning, and that adoption of this approach would help reconcile some inherent conflicts encountered by the Court whenever Teague retroactivity comes before it. Part II of this Article will provide the necessary legal framework, by tracing habeas corpus and the issue of retroactivity from the writ's origins through Teague and its aftermath. Part III will then propose the above mentioned "line of cases" approach and consider its potential in light of the Court's recent holdings in Whorton v. Bockting and Burton v. Stewart. Finally, Part IV will conclude the Article.
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This Article will propose a new approach to overcoming the seemingly insurmountable watershed rule exception. While a single case - such as Crawford or Blakely - may not rise to watershed status, this Article will suggest that a line of cases could be considered watershed. 8 It will be shown that the highly subjective nature of this exception lends itself perfectly to this type of reasoning, and that adoption of this approach would help reconcile some inherent conflicts encountered by the Court whenever Teague retroactivity comes before it. Part II of this Article will provide the necessary legal framework, by tracing habeas corpus and the issue of retroactivity from the writ's origins through Teague and its aftermath. Part III will then propose the above mentioned "line of cases" approach and consider its potential in light of the Court's recent holdings in Whorton v. Bockting and Burton v. Stewart. Finally, Part IV will conclude the Article.
Key concepts: Habeas corpus, Writ, Law, Supreme court, Jury, Prison, Collateral, Political science