Why "Globalization" Didn't Rescue Russia

RUSSIA HAS NOT LIVED up to its hype. After nine years of independence and tens of billions of dollars in international assistance -- not to mention voluminous foreign advice -- Russia is far from having met the expectations of a bright future so widespread in 1991, the time of the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rather, Russia remains a poor, semi-authoritarian country -- a considerable disappointment. Boris Yeltsin's surprise resignation just over a year ago rekindled long-frustrated hopes for rapid improvement. Instead of the ailing and erratic Yeltsin, who appeared to lack both the will and the political muscle to advance a radical reform agenda in his last years in office, Russia would have a younger, more vigorous leader backed by a newly supportive parliament. In fact, on Vladimir Putin's first full day in office as president, President Clinton called the new Russian leader to tell him that he was off to a good start and that his appointment was encouraging for democracy. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright soon said that she was impressed by his can-do approach. Despite this initial optimism from Clinton administration officials, however, Russia's transformation under Putin has begun to look like one step forward and two steps back. While the country is experiencing modest economic growth, largely attributable to windfalls from high oil prices and a cheap currency, its political system and its foreign policy are increasingly troubling. The dictatorship of law proclaimed by the Russian president seems to be taking shape as simply a more effective version of the semiauthoritarian system created by Yeltsin; justice is still dispensed selectively and is used in full force only against political opponents of the regime. Internationally, Moscow seems to be strengthening its ties with former Soviet allies such as North Korea while reviving decades-old efforts to expand and exploit differences between Washington and European capitals. Taking into account these realities, we must ask why Russia has still not met the expectations that so many held for its future. Were our expectations realistic? If not, why not? What should we do? Great expectations THAT 1992 -- the first year of Russian independence -- should be a year of high hopes is hardly surprising. After all, the last months of 1991 were enormously exciting: They saw the end of 70 years of the Soviet empire and produced the enduring and heroic image of Boris Yeltsin fighting for freedom atop a tank in front of the Russian parliament building. The fact that the events of 1991 took place just after those of 1989, when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, contributed to a widespread sense that democracy was sweeping the globe. But by the end of 1992, Russia was plagued with hyperinflation, sharp political conflict, and considerable human suffering. By the end of 1993, Yeltsin had illegally -- by his own admission in his memoir, The Struggle for Russia (1994) -- disbanded the Russian Supreme Soviet and written a new constitution granting vast powers to the country's president, himself. The years 1994 and 1995 brought further troubling developments, most notably Russia's first brutal war in Chechnya and the odious loans-for-shares privatization. Yet throughout this period, and well beyond it, great expectations persisted regarding the development of democracy, the market, and partnership with the United States. Why did these expectations endure? Part of the reason is, of course, that Russia was indeed making some progress. Since independence, Russia has held two presidential elections and three parliamentary elections. Each of these elections has been largely free, though most have been far from fair. Moreover, though cynical perspectives on Russia's underdeveloped democracy are widespread, many Russians have come to see elections as an essential component of their government's political legitimacy. …