Epistemic Warrant: A First Approximation

In order to consider what is particular about warrant by reasoning, an approximate characterization of epistemic warrant in general is in order. 1 In this chapter, I will characterize epistemic warrant by attempting to articulate some general features of it. Most of these features may plausibly be taken as platitudes to be accounted for by any theory of epistemic warrant. However, it is quite difficult to formulate such purported platitudes of warrant in a precise manner without substantive theorizing. Indeed, there is an active debate about how each of them should be formulated. I will not attempt to settle any of these debates in this chapter. Rather, I will provide some rather minimalist characterizations which may serve as the points of departure for the investigation which lies ahead. However, the chapter concludes with some more substantive — and controversial — considerations. For example, I will provide some working-hypotheses about what Gettier-style cases reveal about warrant, relevant alternatives and epistemic normality These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.