Political Apology in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Murayama Statement and Its Receptions in China
Daqing Yang
Abstract
Daqing Yang
Abstract
The 1995 statement by Japan’s socialist prime minister Tomiichi Murayama, made at a time when history issues had become a major problem between Japan and its neighbors, was welcomed in China. However, it did not constitute a turning point, largely because subsequent statements and actions by some Japanese politicians seemed to contradict its spirit. Although the Murayama Statement has been upheld by all subsequent cabinets in Japan, its efficacy in managing Sino-Japanese relations was limited until the Chinese government and analysts began searching for a new approach to Japan policy to bring the escalating history problems under control. Since 2006, the spirit of the Murayama Statement, coupled with a tacit understanding concerning mutual self-restraint, has become a minimum condition for China to contain its history problems with Japan. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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The 1995 statement by Japan’s socialist prime minister Tomiichi Murayama, made at a time when history issues had become a major problem between Japan and its neighbors, was welcomed in China. However, it did not constitute a turning point, largely because subsequent statements and actions by some Japanese politicians seemed to contradict its spirit. Although the Murayama Statement has been upheld by all subsequent cabinets in Japan, its efficacy in managing Sino-Japanese relations was limited until the Chinese government and analysts began searching for a new approach to Japan policy to bring the escalating history problems under control. Since 2006, the spirit of the Murayama Statement, coupled with a tacit understanding concerning mutual self-restraint, has become a minimum condition for China to contain its history problems with Japan. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Key concepts: China, Statement (logic), Politics, Political science, Law