A Critique of Non‐foundationalism

Philosophically, anti‐realist forms of non‐foundationalism face a number of difficulties: Richard Rorty's alethic apathy must be rejected, since truth is by definition important, while Hilary Putnam's internal realism fails because not everything can be relativized to one's conceptual scheme. Unqualified alethic anti‐realism also faces difficulties and must be rejected. The metaphysical anti‐realism that non‐foundationalists often hold is ambiguous and can be interpreted in terms of Kantian anti‐realism, causal anti‐realism, trivialism, or constitutive anti‐realism. Unfortunately, none of these interpretations is non‐trivial, coherent, and plausible. Similar problems accompany theological forms of non‐foundationalism. Grenz's eschatological realism is incoherent, or at least very implausible, and it collapses into a metaphysical account of present reality. Murphy's strong commitment to fallibilism undermines necessary theological claims and devolves into scepticism.