The Reflexively Assumed Self
Miri Albahari
Abstract
Miri Albahari
Abstract
We have extracted the main notion of self that is implicated in Buddhist suttas. It is a self that Buddhism supposes most people to have a sense of being and, furthermore, a self that as a whole lacks reality on the Buddhist metaphysical system (although a subset of its ascribed features, sourced in nibbānic consciousness, do have grounding in reality). In this chapter, I investigate whether most subjects plausibly do, in fact, reflexively identify themselves as such selves. I hence look to whether we as subjects have a sense of being the kind of entity alluded to in Buddhism. If we do indeed harbour this sense of self, as this chapter will argue, then in later chapters we can address the ontological question: are we really the self-entity that we assume we are? If the self is real, then this sense of self will reflect a real self that is sensed. If the self lacks reality, then our sense of self will not reflect an actual self but will have to be explained by factors that do not appeal to the self in their ontology.
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We have extracted the main notion of self that is implicated in Buddhist suttas. It is a self that Buddhism supposes most people to have a sense of being and, furthermore, a self that as a whole lacks reality on the Buddhist metaphysical system (although a subset of its ascribed features, sourced in nibbānic consciousness, do have grounding in reality). In this chapter, I investigate whether most subjects plausibly do, in fact, reflexively identify themselves as such selves. I hence look to whether we as subjects have a sense of being the kind of entity alluded to in Buddhism. If we do indeed harbour this sense of self, as this chapter will argue, then in later chapters we can address the ontological question: are we really the self-entity that we assume we are? If the self is real, then this sense of self will reflect a real self that is sensed. If the self lacks reality, then our sense of self will not reflect an actual self but will have to be explained by factors that do not appeal to the self in their ontology.
Key concepts: Psychology of self, Buddhism, Self, Appeal, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Consciousness, Common sense