Environmental Ethics, Hunting, and the Place of Animals
Gary Varner
Abstract
Gary Varner
Abstract
Abstract This article notes that deep philosophical differences divide environmentalists and animal welfarists. Environmental ethicists often see the practical implications of animal welfare and animal rights views as anti-environmental; they are seen as sometimes harming ecosystems and as sometimes inexcusably banning interventions that environmentalists support. This article argues that environmental ethicists have sometimes zealously caricatured animal welfare and animal rights views, and that a close examination of the interests of each group shows that there is more of a convergence of values than many have thought. While it is true that ecosystems and non-animal species have only instrumental value from an animal welfare or animal rights perspective, an appropriately structured environmental ethic need not deny this claim and can still attribute an appropriate level of value to ecosystems and non-sentient organisms.
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Abstract This article notes that deep philosophical differences divide environmentalists and animal welfarists. Environmental ethicists often see the practical implications of animal welfare and animal rights views as anti-environmental; they are seen as sometimes harming ecosystems and as sometimes inexcusably banning interventions that environmentalists support. This article argues that environmental ethicists have sometimes zealously caricatured animal welfare and animal rights views, and that a close examination of the interests of each group shows that there is more of a convergence of values than many have thought. While it is true that ecosystems and non-animal species have only instrumental value from an animal welfare or animal rights perspective, an appropriately structured environmental ethic need not deny this claim and can still attribute an appropriate level of value to ecosystems and non-sentient organisms.
Key concepts: Animal welfare, Animal rights, Environmental ethics, Value (mathematics), Animal ethics, Perspective (graphical), Intrinsic value (animal ethics), Welfare