2015Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooksRequires access

The Individual and Society

Hugo Strandberg

Open publisher page 4 citations

Abstract

Is it possible to come to know oneself? Is it possible to overcome the difficulties on one’s own? ‘If self-knowledge is about moral goodness, isn’t there social conditions of its possibility? If so, isn’t your understanding of self-knowledge thereby rejected, for in that case self-knowledge isn’t only (or even primarily) my own business? And if we use the concept of responsibility: it is society that has, at least partly, made me into who I am, hasn’t it, and doesn’t this mean that the responsibility for who I am is never entirely mine?’ Kierkegaard in particular is sometimes criticized in this way, criticized for having a naive idea about the individual 1 and her relation to society. 2 Being oneself is impossible and there is no such thing as being oneself, it is said; an individual is who she is through society. In particular, language is stressed: my way of thinking about myself is linguistic through and through, and language is not mine but a social phenomenon. The ways of expression handed down to me through society determine what I am, and am not, able to think. Consequently, it is naive to lay a heavy stress on one’s own standpoints and one’s own responsibility for these. Slavoj Žižek writes: The subject can exonerate himself from responsibility with regard to the symbolic network of tradition which overdetermines his speech; he is justified in claiming: ‘I am not the true author of my statements, since I merely repeat the performative patterns I grew up into — it is the big Other which effectively speaks through me’. 3 These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Is it possible to come to know oneself? Is it possible to overcome the difficulties on one’s own? ‘If self-knowledge is about moral goodness, isn’t there social conditions of its possibility? If so, isn’t your understanding of self-knowledge thereby rejected, for in that case self-knowledge isn’t only (or even primarily) my own business? And if we use the concept of responsibility: it is society that has, at least partly, made me into who I am, hasn’t it, and doesn’t this mean that the responsibility for who I am is never entirely mine?’ Kierkegaard in particular is sometimes criticized in this way, criticized for having a naive idea about the individual 1 and her relation to society. 2 Being oneself is impossible and there is no such thing as being oneself, it is said; an individual is who she is through society. In particular, language is stressed: my way of thinking about myself is linguistic through and through, and language is not mine but a social phenomenon. The ways of expression handed down to me through society determine what I am, and am not, able to think. Consequently, it is naive to lay a heavy stress on one’s own standpoints and one’s own responsibility for these. Slavoj Žižek writes: The subject can exonerate himself from responsibility with regard to the symbolic network of tradition which overdetermines his speech; he is justified in claiming: ‘I am not the true author of my statements, since I merely repeat the performative patterns I grew up into — it is the big Other which effectively speaks through me’. 3 These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Available abstract

Is it possible to come to know oneself? Is it possible to overcome the difficulties on one’s own? ‘If self-knowledge is about moral goodness, isn’t there social conditions of its possibility? If so, isn’t your understanding of self-knowledge thereby rejected, for in that case self-knowledge isn’t only (or even primarily) my own business? And if we use the concept of responsibility: it is society that has, at least partly, made me into who I am, hasn’t it, and doesn’t this mean that the responsibility for who I am is never entirely mine?’ Kierkegaard in particular is sometimes criticized in this way, criticized for having a naive idea about the individual 1 and her relation to society. 2 Being oneself is impossible and there is no such thing as being oneself, it is said; an individual is who she is through society. In particular, language is stressed: my way of thinking about myself is linguistic through and through, and language is not mine but a social phenomenon. The ways of expression handed down to me through society determine what I am, and am not, able to think. Consequently, it is naive to lay a heavy stress on one’s own standpoints and one’s own responsibility for these. Slavoj Žižek writes: The subject can exonerate himself from responsibility with regard to the symbolic network of tradition which overdetermines his speech; he is justified in claiming: ‘I am not the true author of my statements, since I merely repeat the performative patterns I grew up into — it is the big Other which effectively speaks through me’. 3 These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Key concepts: Relation (database), Subject (documents), Epistemology, Reflexive pronoun, Phenomenon, Sociology, Psychology, Social psychology

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