2016Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

Monism and Gunk

Jacek Brzozowski

Open publisher page 6 citations

Abstract

Abstract Monismis the view that there exists just one fundamental object—the whole world. Monism (and the opposing view, Pluralism) can be placed in a framework of metaphysical priority whereby parts or wholes are then derived from whatever is fundamental. A supposed advantage of monism over pluralism is that it is better suited to accommodate gunk worlds, where each object has further parts. But on closer inspection, appeal to gunk worlds does not give monism a clear cut advantage over pluralism. Either monism faces worries similar to those of pluralism, or else it cannot explain how properties of composite objects supervene on those of their parts. So an appeal to gunk worlds does not support monism over pluralism.

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What this paper is about

Abstract Monismis the view that there exists just one fundamental object—the whole world. Monism (and the opposing view, Pluralism) can be placed in a framework of metaphysical priority whereby parts or wholes are then derived from whatever is fundamental. A supposed advantage of monism over pluralism is that it is better suited to accommodate gunk worlds, where each object has further parts. But on closer inspection, appeal to gunk worlds does not give monism a clear cut advantage over pluralism. Either monism faces worries similar to those of pluralism, or else it cannot explain how properties of composite objects supervene on those of their parts. So an appeal to gunk worlds does not support monism over pluralism.

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Available abstract

Abstract Monismis the view that there exists just one fundamental object—the whole world. Monism (and the opposing view, Pluralism) can be placed in a framework of metaphysical priority whereby parts or wholes are then derived from whatever is fundamental. A supposed advantage of monism over pluralism is that it is better suited to accommodate gunk worlds, where each object has further parts. But on closer inspection, appeal to gunk worlds does not give monism a clear cut advantage over pluralism. Either monism faces worries similar to those of pluralism, or else it cannot explain how properties of composite objects supervene on those of their parts. So an appeal to gunk worlds does not support monism over pluralism.

Key concepts: Monism, Pluralism (philosophy), Appeal, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy, Object (grammar), Political science

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