2013•Unpublished venueOpen access

Rationality and Normativity

John Broome

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Abstract

Is rationality actually normative? This chapter considers the answer for this ‘Normative Question’ about rationality. According to Normativity of Rationality, when rationality requires something of you, it will normally be the case that you ought to achieve that thing. The chapter describes a few rather miscellaneous remarks to make about the connection between reasons and rationality. It also considers whether rationality is derivatively normative. Rationality might nevertheless be normative, though not derivatively so. If it is, when rationality requires you to F, this fact is a reason for you to F, but no explanation of why it is a reason stems from a source of requirements other than rationality itself. Then rationality is non-derivatively normative.

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Is rationality actually normative? This chapter considers the answer for this ‘Normative Question’ about rationality. According to Normativity of Rationality, when rationality requires something of you, it will normally be the case that you ought to achieve that thing. The chapter describes a few rather miscellaneous remarks to make about the connection between reasons and rationality. It also considers whether rationality is derivatively normative. Rationality might nevertheless be normative, though not derivatively so. If it is, when rationality requires you to F, this fact is a reason for you to F, but no explanation of why it is a reason stems from a source of requirements other than rationality itself. Then rationality is non-derivatively normative.

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Available abstract

Is rationality actually normative? This chapter considers the answer for this ‘Normative Question’ about rationality. According to Normativity of Rationality, when rationality requires something of you, it will normally be the case that you ought to achieve that thing. The chapter describes a few rather miscellaneous remarks to make about the connection between reasons and rationality. It also considers whether rationality is derivatively normative. Rationality might nevertheless be normative, though not derivatively so. If it is, when rationality requires you to F, this fact is a reason for you to F, but no explanation of why it is a reason stems from a source of requirements other than rationality itself. Then rationality is non-derivatively normative.

Key concepts: Rationality, Normative, Great Rationality Debate, Principle of rationality, Ecological rationality, Epistemology, Philosophy

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