1992Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooksRequires access

The Hidden Costs of Arms Control

Dorinda G. Dallmeyer

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

The entry into force of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in June 1988 marked an unprecedented step forward in monitoring compliance with arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union. No longer must the two sides depend solely upon national technical means of verification (NTM), that is primarily reconnaissance satellites, to ensure the other party’s adherence to treaty obligations. Henceforth NTM may be augmented with a wide variety of on-site inspections and data exchanges. Chief among the inspection innovations in the INF Treaty are provisions for long-term monitoring of former missile production facilities; on-site inspection of the elimination of missiles, launchers, and support facilities; data exchanges on missile inventories with the opportunity for on-site confirmation; and short-notice inspections over the thirteen years of the Treaty’s duration. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The entry into force of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in June 1988 marked an unprecedented step forward in monitoring compliance with arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union. No longer must the two sides depend solely upon national technical means of verification (NTM), that is primarily reconnaissance satellites, to ensure the other party’s adherence to treaty obligations. Henceforth NTM may be augmented with a wide variety of on-site inspections and data exchanges. Chief among the inspection innovations in the INF Treaty are provisions for long-term monitoring of former missile production facilities; on-site inspection of the elimination of missiles, launchers, and support facilities; data exchanges on missile inventories with the opportunity for on-site confirmation; and short-notice inspections over the thirteen years of the Treaty’s duration. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The entry into force of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in June 1988 marked an unprecedented step forward in monitoring compliance with arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union. No longer must the two sides depend solely upon national technical means of verification (NTM), that is primarily reconnaissance satellites, to ensure the other party’s adherence to treaty obligations. Henceforth NTM may be augmented with a wide variety of on-site inspections and data exchanges. Chief among the inspection innovations in the INF Treaty are provisions for long-term monitoring of former missile production facilities; on-site inspection of the elimination of missiles, launchers, and support facilities; data exchanges on missile inventories with the opportunity for on-site confirmation; and short-notice inspections over the thirteen years of the Treaty’s duration. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Key concepts: Treaty, Notice, Arms control, Missile, Control (management), Variety (cybernetics), Political science, Business

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
The Hidden Costs of Arms Control — Research Paper | ScholarLens