Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism in India—Theoretical Perspective
I. Sridhar
Abstract
Open-access reader
I. Sridhar
Abstract
Open-access reader
The origin of division of powers between Board of Directors and Shareholders has been subject of different judicial interpretations. Company law is a standard federal law. Hence, it envisages a clear division of powers between Shareholders and Board of Directors. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the methods and role envisaged for shareholders in corporate governance, given the little incentives and limited means available to them to perform any supervisory function over Board of Directors. The study reports, that it is difficult to tie down any definite role for investors in corporate governance. Corporate governance ought to shift from being a procedural requirement when it comes to addressing the issue of shareholder activism. An implication of the study is to put emphasis for enforcement of shareholder rights through civil proceedings. This can be achieved by introducing substantive provisions codifying duty of care, fiduciary role-playing requirements for Board of Directors.
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The origin of division of powers between Board of Directors and Shareholders has been subject of different judicial interpretations. Company law is a standard federal law. Hence, it envisages a clear division of powers between Shareholders and Board of Directors. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the methods and role envisaged for shareholders in corporate governance, given the little incentives and limited means available to them to perform any supervisory function over Board of Directors. The study reports, that it is difficult to tie down any definite role for investors in corporate governance. Corporate governance ought to shift from being a procedural requirement when it comes to addressing the issue of shareholder activism. An implication of the study is to put emphasis for enforcement of shareholder rights through civil proceedings. This can be achieved by introducing substantive provisions codifying duty of care, fiduciary role-playing requirements for Board of Directors.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Corporate governance, Fiduciary, Shareholder resolution, Accounting, Corporate law, Enforcement, Business