2014Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

Fictional Worlds and Fiction Operators

Mark Sainsbury

Open publisher page 33 citations

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to show that we cannot deepen our understanding of fiction, or of fiction operators, by appeal to fictional worlds. First, it is shown that there are many different fiction operators, with different truth conditions. (For example, ‘In War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters’ is true, but ‘According to War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters’ is false.) It follows that no one worlds-based account can be right for all of them. Secondly, it is shown that some fictional operators place specific requirements on the actual world, and so cannot be analysed purely in terms of how things are in non-actual worlds. (Example: ‘Most readers of Pride and Prejudice find that Elizabeth Bennett is charming’.) Thirdly, it is shown that worlds-based accounts cannot avoid epistemic circularity: determining which worlds are appropriate requires first attaining an interpretation of the fiction.

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What this paper is about

The aim of this chapter is to show that we cannot deepen our understanding of fiction, or of fiction operators, by appeal to fictional worlds. First, it is shown that there are many different fiction operators, with different truth conditions. (For example, ‘In War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters’ is true, but ‘According to War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters’ is false.) It follows that no one worlds-based account can be right for all of them. Secondly, it is shown that some fictional operators place specific requirements on the actual world, and so cannot be analysed purely in terms of how things are in non-actual worlds. (Example: ‘Most readers of Pride and Prejudice find that Elizabeth Bennett is charming’.) Thirdly, it is shown that worlds-based accounts cannot avoid epistemic circularity: determining which worlds are appropriate requires first attaining an interpretation of the fiction.

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Available abstract

The aim of this chapter is to show that we cannot deepen our understanding of fiction, or of fiction operators, by appeal to fictional worlds. First, it is shown that there are many different fiction operators, with different truth conditions. (For example, ‘In War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters’ is true, but ‘According to War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters’ is false.) It follows that no one worlds-based account can be right for all of them. Secondly, it is shown that some fictional operators place specific requirements on the actual world, and so cannot be analysed purely in terms of how things are in non-actual worlds. (Example: ‘Most readers of Pride and Prejudice find that Elizabeth Bennett is charming’.) Thirdly, it is shown that worlds-based accounts cannot avoid epistemic circularity: determining which worlds are appropriate requires first attaining an interpretation of the fiction.

Key concepts: Possible world, Fictional universe, Pride, Fiction theory, Interpretation (philosophy), Prejudice (legal term), Appeal, Epistemology

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