CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
H. L. A. Hart
Abstract
H. L. A. Hart
Abstract
This chapter discusses the changing conceptions about criminal responsibility in England. It focuses on changes towards the whole doctrine of the mental element in responsibility, which is considered more important than any particular change in the detail of the doctrine of mens rea. It proposes an alternative scheme called the ‘moderate’ form of the new doctrine, where mens rea would continue to be a necessary condition of liability to be investigated and settled before conviction, except where it relates to mental abnormality. An accused person would no longer be able to adduce any form of mental abnormality as a bar to conviction. The question of his mental abnormality would be investigated only after conviction and would be primarily concerned with his present rather than his past mental state. His past mental state at the time of his crime would only be relevant where it provided ancillary evidence of the nature of his abnormality and indicated the appropriate treatment.
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This chapter discusses the changing conceptions about criminal responsibility in England. It focuses on changes towards the whole doctrine of the mental element in responsibility, which is considered more important than any particular change in the detail of the doctrine of mens rea. It proposes an alternative scheme called the ‘moderate’ form of the new doctrine, where mens rea would continue to be a necessary condition of liability to be investigated and settled before conviction, except where it relates to mental abnormality. An accused person would no longer be able to adduce any form of mental abnormality as a bar to conviction. The question of his mental abnormality would be investigated only after conviction and would be primarily concerned with his present rather than his past mental state. His past mental state at the time of his crime would only be relevant where it provided ancillary evidence of the nature of his abnormality and indicated the appropriate treatment.
Key concepts: Conviction, Mens rea, Doctrine, Mental state, Abnormality, Element (criminal law), Diminished responsibility, Psychology