Playing for Time? Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy
Wyn Q. Bowen, Dina Esfandiary, Matthew Moran
Abstract
Wyn Q. Bowen, Dina Esfandiary, Matthew Moran
Abstract
The focus of this chapter is Iran’s nuclear diplomacy from 2002 to 2012 because it was during this period that the country made the advances that subsequently ensured the long-term continuity of the nuclear programme. The chapter demonstrates that Iran’s diplomatic activity comprised three main strands. First, Iran sought to play on differences between the Western powers on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other, in order to weaken the international consensus on how to respond to the Iranian nuclear challenge. Second, Tehran would reach agreements with its negotiating partners and then renege on them or suggest alternatives. Third, the Iranians capitalised on non-nuclear weapon states’ concerns regarding the use of nuclear technology for civil purposes. These diplomatic approaches bought time for the nuclear programme to develop, notably the capacity to enrich uranium, while also delaying the imposition of penalties for Iran’s transgressions. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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The focus of this chapter is Iran’s nuclear diplomacy from 2002 to 2012 because it was during this period that the country made the advances that subsequently ensured the long-term continuity of the nuclear programme. The chapter demonstrates that Iran’s diplomatic activity comprised three main strands. First, Iran sought to play on differences between the Western powers on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other, in order to weaken the international consensus on how to respond to the Iranian nuclear challenge. Second, Tehran would reach agreements with its negotiating partners and then renege on them or suggest alternatives. Third, the Iranians capitalised on non-nuclear weapon states’ concerns regarding the use of nuclear technology for civil purposes. These diplomatic approaches bought time for the nuclear programme to develop, notably the capacity to enrich uranium, while also delaying the imposition of penalties for Iran’s transgressions. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Key concepts: Diplomacy, Negotiation, China, Political science, Nuclear weapon, Nuclear technology, Order (exchange), Law