Ontology and Empirical Realism

Since both Bhaskar and Kant claim to be realists of some kind, and empirical realism is the focus of this chapter, I would like to begin by briefly discussing the general concept of realism. As is well known, the term ‘realism’ originated in Scholasticism, in which it denoted the position that affirms the existence of universals and was opposed to nominalism, which denied the existence of universals.’ Contemporarily, ‘realism’ has much wider application. As Bhaskar notes, ‘In its broadest sense in philosophy any position can be nominated “realist” which asserts the existence of some disputed kind of entity (universals, material objects, causal laws, numbers, probabilities, propositions, etc.)’ (SRHE 5). Thus realism (and anti-realism, which denies existence) is usually about something contentious. 2 Once this is understood, the Scholastic definition of ‘realism’ can be retrospectively seen as a particular instance of a more general meaning — and today it is often referred to as ‘Platonic realism’ to indicate its specificity — just as nominalism can be seen as a specific kind of anti-realism. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.