Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement

A t NATO’s Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to join the Alliance. The Alliance also committed itself to “extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership.” 1 So far, so good. However, enlargement is, in many ways, an affliction, not just for the Alliance but also for the EU. Indeed, the two enlargements are intrinsically linked because the stabilization of the European security space is as much (if not more) about economic security, as military. Although they are linked they are not politically compatible, and because of the political complications they entail and the pressures they create enlargement undoubtedly destabilizes transatlantic relations at a time when the emphasis is on the search for a new political bargain between traditional members. This search is lent some urgency by the election of a new administration seemingly less predisposed toward Europe and the allies, and yet for whom enlargement, of both the EU and NATO, remains a sine qua non of the wider relationship. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.