A priori versus redescriptive physicalism

This chapter looks at the arguments for a priori physicalism, some of whose exponents aim to refute physicalism by demonstrating the falsity of a priori physicalism. Do Jackson and Chalmers’s arguments show that physicalism absolutely requires the a priori entailment thesis (in which case physicalism is doomed), or do they take us no further than the l-c thesis (in which case they strengthen the case for redescriptive physicalism)? Those arguments turn out to be seriously defective. To the extent that they are not, they take us no further than the view that physicalism requires the l-c entailment thesis. Nor does the two-dimensional framework Chalmers appeals to in his version of the conceivability argument offer an escape from earlier conclusions. Arguments from Block, Stalnaker, and others against a priori physicalism do not threaten the different view that physicalism requires the l-c entailment thesis.