Why the Village Has No Power: Land Ownership Disputes and Customary Tenure
Peter Ho
Abstract
Peter Ho
Abstract
Abstract Starts with a historical analysis of China’s land property structure and its weaknesses. It is argued that the former production team exercised no real power over land, even though it enjoyed formal land ownership. Instead, control over land ownership resided with the commune and the local state. This has resulted in frequent illegal land expropriation, the neglect of customary rights, and the failure to register land. Through an analysis of a unique set of court cases it is shown how this historical background is the source for many land disputes between the state and the collective.
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Abstract Starts with a historical analysis of China’s land property structure and its weaknesses. It is argued that the former production team exercised no real power over land, even though it enjoyed formal land ownership. Instead, control over land ownership resided with the commune and the local state. This has resulted in frequent illegal land expropriation, the neglect of customary rights, and the failure to register land. Through an analysis of a unique set of court cases it is shown how this historical background is the source for many land disputes between the state and the collective.
Key concepts: Expropriation, Customary land, Land tenure, State (computer science), Common ownership, Power (physics), Land law, Business