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2009•Unpublished venueRequires access

The Counterfactual Theory of Causation

Michael S. Moore

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines the counterfactual theory of causation, applying the possible world conception of counterfactuals. A wide variety of reasons is given in support for the conclusion that not only is causation not to be identified with counterfactual dependency, but that such dependency is also not either a necessary or a sufficient condition for causation. Such dependency is thus unreliable even as a test for when causation is present or absent, to say nothing of being an implausible theory about the nature of causation.

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Abstract This chapter examines the counterfactual theory of causation, applying the possible world conception of counterfactuals. A wide variety of reasons is given in support for the conclusion that not only is causation not to be identified with counterfactual dependency, but that such dependency is also not either a necessary or a sufficient condition for causation. Such dependency is thus unreliable even as a test for when causation is present or absent, to say nothing of being an implausible theory about the nature of causation.

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Available abstract

Abstract This chapter examines the counterfactual theory of causation, applying the possible world conception of counterfactuals. A wide variety of reasons is given in support for the conclusion that not only is causation not to be identified with counterfactual dependency, but that such dependency is also not either a necessary or a sufficient condition for causation. Such dependency is thus unreliable even as a test for when causation is present or absent, to say nothing of being an implausible theory about the nature of causation.

Key concepts: Counterfactual thinking, Causation, Counterfactual conditional, Dependency (UML), Nothing, Epistemology, Psychology, Positive economics

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