2016Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

The Constitutional Separation of Powers

Aileen Kavanagh

Open publisher page 51 citations

Abstract

This chapter rejects the traditional ‘pure view’ of the separation of powers based on a strict separation between three mutually exclusive functions. It argues, instead, that we should think of the separation of powers as requiring two dimensions: a division of labour between the three branches of government where each branch plays a distinct role in the constitutional scheme, and a requirement of adequate checks and balances between the branches. It argues, further, that these dual dimensions of the separation of powers—division of labour and checks and balances—are both underpinned by the value of coordinated institutional effort in the service of good government. This is the separation of powers in a joint enterprise.

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What this paper is about

This chapter rejects the traditional ‘pure view’ of the separation of powers based on a strict separation between three mutually exclusive functions. It argues, instead, that we should think of the separation of powers as requiring two dimensions: a division of labour between the three branches of government where each branch plays a distinct role in the constitutional scheme, and a requirement of adequate checks and balances between the branches. It argues, further, that these dual dimensions of the separation of powers—division of labour and checks and balances—are both underpinned by the value of coordinated institutional effort in the service of good government. This is the separation of powers in a joint enterprise.

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OpenAlex reports 51 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This chapter rejects the traditional ‘pure view’ of the separation of powers based on a strict separation between three mutually exclusive functions. It argues, instead, that we should think of the separation of powers as requiring two dimensions: a division of labour between the three branches of government where each branch plays a distinct role in the constitutional scheme, and a requirement of adequate checks and balances between the branches. It argues, further, that these dual dimensions of the separation of powers—division of labour and checks and balances—are both underpinned by the value of coordinated institutional effort in the service of good government. This is the separation of powers in a joint enterprise.

Key concepts: Separation of powers, Separation (statistics), Government (linguistics), Dual (grammatical number), Enumerated powers, Division (mathematics), Joint (building), Law and economics

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