過渡與開端——從萊維納斯觀點探問《存在與時間》之此在與存有論意涵

In God, Death and Time Levinas has pointed out that, Heidegger's thesis still originates from the significance of Being. Such statement for the phenomenology which is crucial to the transition from ＂Being＂ to ＂Significance＂, has designated that Heidegger was no longer a phenomenologist after Being and Time, besides, Heidegger's claim for the significance surrounded by Being could not provide any possibility of conceiving the question of human beings beyond Being. Husserl's critique has drawn up the difference between Heidegger and the phenomenology, and Levinas' criticism has distinguished Heidegger from the ethics. In this thesis, we will dispose the discussion in Levinas' explanation for Heidegger. Apart from attempting to investigate whether such explanation from Levinas who has regarded Heidegger's thoughts as ＂a necessary transition＂ is legitimate or not, we will also try to rethink carefully the relation between the traditional ontology, and Heidegger's ontology which poses a question of the significance of ＂Being＂ from the subject of ＂Dasein＂.