Wittgenstein, constructivism, and mathematical proof

RFM), contain a sustained attack on this view. However, taking my point of departure from Dummett's classic article, 'Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics',1 it becomes apparent that this is precisely the issue that separates Wittgenstein from all other approaches in the philosophy of mathematics. That is, whereas Wittgenstein rejects the notion of proof as logically compelling us, almost all other doctrines both Platonist and constructivist - accept it. In sections 2 and 4 of the paper, I consider Dummett's view that this commits Wittgenstein to a radical and implausible conventionalism and that the proper response to Platonism is to adopt a more moderate constructivism (such as intuitionism). In section 3, I argue against the strict finitisi interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of mathematics, which is the most common characterisation of his conception and attributes to him an even more radical revision of mathematics than that advocated by intuitionism. Most interpreters argue that Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics is too extreme to be plausible, and the source of this lies in their reaction to his remarks on mathematical proof