Explaining Cooperation in Post–Cold War Military Interventions
Sarah E Kreps
Abstract
Sarah E Kreps
Abstract
This chapter develops the argument, drawing on theories of cooperation to develop the two main factors critical to whether states cooperate in times of war: time horizon and operational commitment. It assembles the argument's key assumptions from two types of historical examples—contrasting cases of great powers that have acted with and without restraint, as well as from historical challenges of fighting wars with allies. It goes on to illustrate the basic contours of the argument with reference to post-Cold War cases of intervention.
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This chapter develops the argument, drawing on theories of cooperation to develop the two main factors critical to whether states cooperate in times of war: time horizon and operational commitment. It assembles the argument's key assumptions from two types of historical examples—contrasting cases of great powers that have acted with and without restraint, as well as from historical challenges of fighting wars with allies. It goes on to illustrate the basic contours of the argument with reference to post-Cold War cases of intervention.
Key concepts: Argument (complex analysis), Cold war, Intervention (counseling), Political science, Key (lock), Horizon, Positive economics, Political economy