Truth as Disclosure

Assertion is not the primary “locus” of truth, but … is based … in the disclosedness of Dasein. Martin Heidegger By considering a metacritical denial, an existential affirmation, and a postmetaphysical deconstruction, the first part of this book has demonstrated a need to reconstruct the idea of artistic truth. It has also explored the hermeneutical matrix from which this need arises, namely, the intersection in art between cultural orientation and aesthetic validity, as these become thematic in art talk. The question of artistic truth arises because people in modern Western societies experience art phenomena as aesthetic signs whose meaning can support searches for personal, cultural, and institutional orientation. It also arises because validity claims about such meaning regularly occur in our talking about art. Whereas metacritical denial and postmetaphysical deconstruction throw doubt on the validity of such claims, existential affirmation tends to embrace artistic import without worrying sufficiently about its distinctive validity. My challenge now is to fashion an idea of artistic truth that both addresses questions of validity and distinguishes artistic truth from the logical validity of propositions. It must be an idea that does not employ a propositionally inflected correspondence theory of truth, yet does not entail an antipropositional stance. My response to this challenge has three stages. First Chapter 4 develops a general conception of truth as life-giving disclosure.