OF POSITIVISM: AND THE RELATION OF SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY

Assailed, but not enthralled. STILL it may be asked, why should we not rest in the natural idea of a real existence, of which the properties are inertness and resistance, with a capacity for motion, such as we think of under the name of matter, and which we seem to understand so well until we are called upon to put the opinion to the test? Why should we not believe that such an existence has been created, even though we cannot conceive how it can be, and find ourselves driven into contradictions when we argue respecting it? Is it not better to remain in such an assurance as that acceptance of our natural ideas may give us, and to adjust our conceptions of spiritual things, and our belief respecting a higher existence, to that view of the world; pursuing rather questions of a practical bearing, in respect to which we can attain definite results? Why should our thoughts be unsettled: if these things are not truly as we feel them to be, is it not better, nevertheless, that we should believe them to be so? A fatal objection lies against this compromise. It cannot be carried out. Men refuse to be bound by it. Nor can any means be found of giving it a practical effect. He who argues against the unflinching pursuit of truth cuts awav the basis of all argument, and man's best instincts take part against him. Whatever the truth may be, it must be better to know it than to be in error; it must be a sacred and preeminent duty to accept it.