Stefano Vaselli
Abstract
The present article examines radical methodological individualism as defended by Berlin, Popper and Hayek. We stress two dogmas: social nominalism (according to which individuals are the only admissible denizens of social ontology), and the invisible hand. We claim that the two dogmas do not logically coincide, contrary to what usually held by individualistic ideology.
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The present article examines radical methodological individualism as defended by Berlin, Popper and Hayek. We stress two dogmas: social nominalism (according to which individuals are the only admissible denizens of social ontology), and the invisible hand. We claim that the two dogmas do not logically coincide, contrary to what usually held by individualistic ideology.
Key concepts: Individualism, Ideology, Nominalism, Social ontology, Ontology, Epistemology, Methodological individualism, Philosophy