1996•Unpublished venueOpen access

NRC confirmatory AP600 safety system phase I testing in the ROSA/AP600 test facility

Gun-Joo Rhee, Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA), Yutaka Kukita, R. Schultz

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Abstract

The NRC confirmatory phase I testing for the AP600 safety systems has been completed in the modified ROSA (Rig of Safety Assessment) test facility located at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) campus in Tokai, Japan. The test matrix included a variety of accident scenarios covering both design and beyond-design basis accidents. The test results indicate the AP600 safety systems as reflected in ROSA appear to perform as designed and there is no danger of core heatup for the accident scenarios investigated. In addition, no detrimental system interactions nor adverse effects of non-safety systems on the safety system functions were identified. However, three phenomena of interest have been identified for further examination to determine whether they are relevant to the AP600 plant. Those three phenomena are: (1) a potential for water hammer caused by rapid condensation which may occur following the actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS), (2) a large thermal gradient in the cold leg pipe where cooled water returns from the passive residual heat removal system and forms a thermally stratified layer, and (3) system-wide oscillations initiating following the ADS stage 4 actuation and persisting until the liquid in the pressurizer drains and steam generation in the core becomes insignificant.

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What this paper is about

The NRC confirmatory phase I testing for the AP600 safety systems has been completed in the modified ROSA (Rig of Safety Assessment) test facility located at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) campus in Tokai, Japan. The test matrix included a variety of accident scenarios covering both design and beyond-design basis accidents. The test results indicate the AP600 safety systems as reflected in ROSA appear to perform as designed and there is no danger of core heatup for the accident scenarios investigated. In addition, no detrimental system interactions nor adverse effects of non-safety systems on the safety system functions were identified. However, three phenomena of interest have been identified for further examination to determine whether they are relevant to the AP600 plant. Those three phenomena are: (1) a potential for water hammer caused by rapid condensation which may occur following the actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS), (2) a large thermal gradient in the cold leg pipe where cooled water returns from the passive residual heat removal system and forms a thermally stratified layer, and (3) system-wide oscillations initiating following the ADS stage 4 actuation and persisting until the liquid in the pressurizer drains and steam generation in the core becomes insignificant.

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Available abstract

The NRC confirmatory phase I testing for the AP600 safety systems has been completed in the modified ROSA (Rig of Safety Assessment) test facility located at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) campus in Tokai, Japan. The test matrix included a variety of accident scenarios covering both design and beyond-design basis accidents. The test results indicate the AP600 safety systems as reflected in ROSA appear to perform as designed and there is no danger of core heatup for the accident scenarios investigated. In addition, no detrimental system interactions nor adverse effects of non-safety systems on the safety system functions were identified. However, three phenomena of interest have been identified for further examination to determine whether they are relevant to the AP600 plant. Those three phenomena are: (1) a potential for water hammer caused by rapid condensation which may occur following the actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS), (2) a large thermal gradient in the cold leg pipe where cooled water returns from the passive residual heat removal system and forms a thermally stratified layer, and (3) system-wide oscillations initiating following the ADS stage 4 actuation and persisting until the liquid in the pressurizer drains and steam generation in the core becomes insignificant.

Key concepts: Cabin pressurization, Water hammer, Hammer, Thermal hydraulics, Engineering, System safety, Safety valve, Environmental science

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