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Physician responses to fee-for-service and capitation payment.

Sally C. Stearns, Barbara Wolfe, David A. Kindig

Open publisher page 80 citations

Abstract

The ability to achieve reductions in health care costs is determined in part by physician payment mechanisms. This study observes the response to a change in the reimbursement mechanism by a group of physicians who participated in a fee-for-service plan and then formed an IPA using capitation payment for primary care physicians and a reduced fee schedule for specialists. Patient benefits were similar under the two plans. Analyses of data for a group of continuous enrollees show that the change in the physician payment mechanism was associated with a reduction in hospitalizations but increases in length of hospital stay and number of ambulatory visits. These increases may have occurred because capitation for primary care physicians and a reduced fee schedule for specialists led to a greater number of referrals with no incentive in place for reductions in length of stay for specialty admissions.

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What this paper is about

The ability to achieve reductions in health care costs is determined in part by physician payment mechanisms. This study observes the response to a change in the reimbursement mechanism by a group of physicians who participated in a fee-for-service plan and then formed an IPA using capitation payment for primary care physicians and a reduced fee schedule for specialists. Patient benefits were similar under the two plans. Analyses of data for a group of continuous enrollees show that the change in the physician payment mechanism was associated with a reduction in hospitalizations but increases in length of hospital stay and number of ambulatory visits. These increases may have occurred because capitation for primary care physicians and a reduced fee schedule for specialists led to a greater number of referrals with no incentive in place for reductions in length of stay for specialty admissions.

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Available abstract

The ability to achieve reductions in health care costs is determined in part by physician payment mechanisms. This study observes the response to a change in the reimbursement mechanism by a group of physicians who participated in a fee-for-service plan and then formed an IPA using capitation payment for primary care physicians and a reduced fee schedule for specialists. Patient benefits were similar under the two plans. Analyses of data for a group of continuous enrollees show that the change in the physician payment mechanism was associated with a reduction in hospitalizations but increases in length of hospital stay and number of ambulatory visits. These increases may have occurred because capitation for primary care physicians and a reduced fee schedule for specialists led to a greater number of referrals with no incentive in place for reductions in length of stay for specialty admissions.

Key concepts: Capitation, Reimbursement, Payment, Fee-for-service, Specialty, Incentive, Capitation fee, Medicine

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