An Examination of the United States Navy's Ability to Conduct Operational Fires

The end of the Cold War has removed the challenge to the United States Navy's preeminence in maritime affairs. In wake of this development, how can the Navy best participate in coordinated joint and combined warfare against a land power? The operational level of war links strategy to tactics and represents a framework for the conduct of modern warfare. To determine if sufficient Navy fire support assets exist to support this concept of modern warfare, this monograph examines the fire support means and doctrines to determine the validity of operational fires as a possible Navy mission area. This work initially examines the historical, strategic, and operational background of the issue. It then establishes the utility of fires using evidence and principles espoused by the classical military, naval, maritime, and air theorists. Next, a historical example is examined to demonstrate the importance of and past problems associated with operational fires. Current doctrine is examined to demonstrate the paucity of naval thought on this subject when compared with the other services. Present and future means of naval operational fire support are examined to determine whether sufficient assets exist to conduct operational fires. Finally, an analysis of the Navy's participation in the recent Gulf War is conducted to determine if the Navy performed fires at the operational-level, and if so, to what level of proficiency. This analysis is conducted using the criteria of “necessary and sufficient,” “suitable, feasible, and acceptable,” and “affordable.” Based on the analysis conducted, current naval assets are capable of conducting operational fires if sufficient planning time is provided to adequately develop and refine the individual cruise missile missions. This planning system, as currently configured, is awkward and not capable of responding to emergent battlefield requirements and extenuating circumstances. This planning system requires an upgrade to reduce the required planning time to construct and implement fire support and make fires more responsive in the support of the operational commander.