The Comparative Variability Theory of Causation
Alexander Reutlinger
Abstract
Alexander Reutlinger
Abstract
So, where are we? Let me briefly summarize what I have presented and argued for so far. Part I set the stage for the discussion about causation in the special sciences. Chapter 1 elaborated criteria of adequacy for an explication of causation in the special sciences (the naturalist and the distinction criterion). Chapter 2 introduced the influential interventionist theory of causation. I focused on Woodward’s widely-received interventionist approach according to which X causes Y iff, roughly, there is a possible intervention on X that changes the value of Y . I argued that interventionist theories are prima facie (promising to be) in accord with the criteria of adequacy, although I diagnosed that there are several desiderata that have to be addressed by interventionists (most importantly, interventionists ought to account for the explication of a non-universal law, and for the features of time-asymmetry and causal asymmetry). These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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So, where are we? Let me briefly summarize what I have presented and argued for so far. Part I set the stage for the discussion about causation in the special sciences. Chapter 1 elaborated criteria of adequacy for an explication of causation in the special sciences (the naturalist and the distinction criterion). Chapter 2 introduced the influential interventionist theory of causation. I focused on Woodward’s widely-received interventionist approach according to which X causes Y iff, roughly, there is a possible intervention on X that changes the value of Y . I argued that interventionist theories are prima facie (promising to be) in accord with the criteria of adequacy, although I diagnosed that there are several desiderata that have to be addressed by interventionists (most importantly, interventionists ought to account for the explication of a non-universal law, and for the features of time-asymmetry and causal asymmetry). These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Key concepts: Causation, Explication, Epistemology, Naturalism, Philosophy, Prima facie