1996Unpublished venueRequires access

Plain Meanings, Mischiefs and Purposes

Ian McLeod

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Abstract

It is tempting to assume that the process of statutory interpretation simply requires the identification and application of the literal (or plain) meaning of the enacted words. In fact, however, such simple literalism is fundamentally defective, because it proceeds on the false assumption that a word, or a group of words, will always have a plain meaning. The truth of the matter is that many words have a variety of meanings, and the only way of identifying their meaning on a particular occasion is by reference to the context within which they are used. This proposition is not limited to statutory interpretation, as the examples at p. 12 illustrate. However, a useful judicial statement of the proposition may be found in the case of Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 576, which is discussed at pp. 8–9, Stamp J said:

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What this paper is about

It is tempting to assume that the process of statutory interpretation simply requires the identification and application of the literal (or plain) meaning of the enacted words. In fact, however, such simple literalism is fundamentally defective, because it proceeds on the false assumption that a word, or a group of words, will always have a plain meaning. The truth of the matter is that many words have a variety of meanings, and the only way of identifying their meaning on a particular occasion is by reference to the context within which they are used. This proposition is not limited to statutory interpretation, as the examples at p. 12 illustrate. However, a useful judicial statement of the proposition may be found in the case of Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 576, which is discussed at pp. 8–9, Stamp J said:

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Available abstract

It is tempting to assume that the process of statutory interpretation simply requires the identification and application of the literal (or plain) meaning of the enacted words. In fact, however, such simple literalism is fundamentally defective, because it proceeds on the false assumption that a word, or a group of words, will always have a plain meaning. The truth of the matter is that many words have a variety of meanings, and the only way of identifying their meaning on a particular occasion is by reference to the context within which they are used. This proposition is not limited to statutory interpretation, as the examples at p. 12 illustrate. However, a useful judicial statement of the proposition may be found in the case of Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 576, which is discussed at pp. 8–9, Stamp J said:

Key concepts: Proposition, Meaning (existential), Interpretation (philosophy), Statutory interpretation, Statement (logic), Context (archaeology), Variety (cybernetics), Simple (philosophy)

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