A Definition of Pragmatism

thirteen varieties of Pragmatism, and somewhat later when the Eng lish pragmatist, F. S. C. Schiller, urged that there were as many prag matisms as there were pragmatists,1 some historians of philosophy have tended to claim that Pragmatism, like most philosophical movements, is less like a movement with specific doctrines universally shared by its proponents than it is like a movement loosely bound by a few general beliefs and attitudes that share something of a family resemblance or spirit.2 Doubtless, there is a margin of safety in such generalizations. There is even more safety in refusing to answer the question What is Pragmatism? and making it look as though one is answering it by launching into a detailed examination of the classical pragmatists Peirce, James and Dewey.3 But our persistent and venerable failure as historians of philosophy to offer a concise definition of pragmatism in terms of the basic theses demonstrably held by all classical pragmatists, continues to be a major reason why Pragmatism tends to get such bad press both at home and abroad. At any rate, there are no fewer than eight specific principles adopted by all classical pragmatists and most contemporary pragmatists. Stating these principles will, I think, constitute a fairly clear characterisation of Pragmatism as a movement beginning with Charles Peirce and continuing on to the present in the works of such philosophers as Nicholas Rescher. Moreover, we can, as I also hope to show, further refine our picture of Pragmatism in general by considering issues that separate various pragmatists and galvanize them in the pre sence of their critics. Finally, apart from the fact that it has not yet been clearly and succintly done, a fairly concise characterisation of the principles of Pragmatism will go a long way in the direction of defining what is distinctively Amer ican about American philosophy.4