demonstrates once again that arguments or evidence about the

tical constitutional problems (Anderson, 1955). The Framers clearly wished to have an alternative to congressional proposing of amendments. The procedure set up by Article V whereby two-thirds of the state legislatures could call for a constitutional convention, Gaugush contends, was intended to make the role of Congress or perfunctory. The position is buttressed by analysis of Supreme Court decisions which are said to recognize the ascendancy of the state legislatures vis a vis the Congress in the convention process. But at the close of the article Gaugush deflates the significance of these findings by admitting that Congress' authority to regulate the state application and Convention process has never been seriously challenged. Surely this is a responsibility that of necessity gives Congress more than a minimal or perfunctory role in the convention process. Initially it must decide on the legitimacy of the call. Problems can arise as to the time period within which legislative requests are received. Petitions accumulating over a ten or twenty year period would hardly be accepted by Congress as a valid call. Would the requests have to be in identical language? Would differences in the wording of proposals be sufficient grounds for Congress to disregard the call? Then, if a convention call is accepted as valid, Congress must adopt legislation covering arrangements for the convention and at least some of its operating procedures. The number of delegates, the election districts, and the manner and date of their election must be established. Funds must be appropriated. An officer to convene the gathering must be designated. Whether Congress should go further in mandating the permanent organization of the convention and such matters as its voting procedures and its duration might might well be issues that Congress would undertake to decide. The most serious congressional concern, however, would undoubtedly be to insure that the convention confined itself to the subject for which it was called. The possibility of a runaway convention has dominated discussions of the convention device and greatly affected attitudes toward its possible use.1 Might not a convention, once in session, regard itself as an autonomous representative of the popular will, free from any institutional restraints? Convened to draft a single amendment, could it not undertake to rewrite the entire document, repeal provisions of the Bill of Rights, reverse unpopular Supreme Court decisions, or draft a new Constitution based on a fundamentally different principle of union? Would Congress be obligated to forward such a document to the states for ratification?