COMPA: Detecting Compromised Accounts on Social Networks.
Manuel Egele, Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Krügel, Giovanni Vigna
Abstract
Manuel Egele, Gianluca Stringhini, Christopher Krügel, Giovanni Vigna
Abstract
As social networking sites have risen in popularity, cyber-criminals started to exploit these sites to spread malware and to carry out scams. Previous work has extensively studied the use of fake (Sybil) accounts that attackers set up to distribute spam messages (mostly messages that contain links to scam pages or drive-by download sites). Fake accounts typically exhibit highly anomalous behavior, and hence, are relatively easy to detect. As a response, attackers have started to compromise and abuse legitimate accounts. Compromising legitimate accounts is very effective, as attackers can leverage the trust relationships that the account owners have established in the past. Moreover, compromised accounts are more difficult to clean up because a social network provider cannot simply delete the corresponding profiles. In this paper, we present a novel approach to detect compromised user accounts in social networks, and we apply it to two popular social networking sites, Twitter and Facebook. Our approach uses a composition of statistical modeling and anomaly detection to identify accounts that experience a sudden change in behavior. Since behavior changes can also be due to benign reasons (e.g., a user could switch her preferred client application or post updates at an unusual time), it is necessary to derive a way to distinguish between malicious and legitimate changes. To this end, we look for groups of accounts that all experience similar changes within a short period of time, assuming that these changes are the result of a malicious campaign that is unfolding. We developed a tool, called COMPA, that implements our approach, and we ran it on a large-scale dataset of more than 1.4 billion publicly-available Twitter messages, as well as on a dataset of 106 million Facebook messages. COMPA was able to identify compromised accounts on both social networks with high precision. 1
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As social networking sites have risen in popularity, cyber-criminals started to exploit these sites to spread malware and to carry out scams. Previous work has extensively studied the use of fake (Sybil) accounts that attackers set up to distribute spam messages (mostly messages that contain links to scam pages or drive-by download sites). Fake accounts typically exhibit highly anomalous behavior, and hence, are relatively easy to detect. As a response, attackers have started to compromise and abuse legitimate accounts. Compromising legitimate accounts is very effective, as attackers can leverage the trust relationships that the account owners have established in the past. Moreover, compromised accounts are more difficult to clean up because a social network provider cannot simply delete the corresponding profiles. In this paper, we present a novel approach to detect compromised user accounts in social networks, and we apply it to two popular social networking sites, Twitter and Facebook. Our approach uses a composition of statistical modeling and anomaly detection to identify accounts that experience a sudden change in behavior. Since behavior changes can also be due to benign reasons (e.g., a user could switch her preferred client application or post updates at an unusual time), it is necessary to derive a way to distinguish between malicious and legitimate changes. To this end, we look for groups of accounts that all experience similar changes within a short period of time, assuming that these changes are the result of a malicious campaign that is unfolding. We developed a tool, called COMPA, that implements our approach, and we ran it on a large-scale dataset of more than 1.4 billion publicly-available Twitter messages, as well as on a dataset of 106 million Facebook messages. COMPA was able to identify compromised accounts on both social networks with high precision. 1
Key concepts: Exploit, Computer security, Malware, Leverage (statistics), Internet privacy, Popularity, Computer science, Compromise