Solution of Cryptographic Circuit Based on Transistor Level against DPA Attacks
LU Er-hon
Abstract
LU Er-hon
Abstract
The hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms may leak many side-channel information,as power consumption etc. The Difference Power Analysis (DPA) is the most efficient side-channel attack by analysis power consumption. Some algorithmic countermeasures have been proposed,but most of them rely on the modification at the algorithm level. This paper propose a novel method against DPA,by adding an transistor level circuit to control power consumption,without any algorithmic modification.,making a DPA attack a very difficult task.
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The hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms may leak many side-channel information,as power consumption etc. The Difference Power Analysis (DPA) is the most efficient side-channel attack by analysis power consumption. Some algorithmic countermeasures have been proposed,but most of them rely on the modification at the algorithm level. This paper propose a novel method against DPA,by adding an transistor level circuit to control power consumption,without any algorithmic modification.,making a DPA attack a very difficult task.
Key concepts: Computer science, Power analysis, Side channel attack, Cryptography, Embedded system, Power consumption, Transistor, Cryptographic primitive