An Analysis of Some Problems on Executive Stock Options
Yu Shan
Abstract
Yu Shan
Abstract
As incentive mechanism established for senior managers of companies, executive stock options aim to solve the agency problem in modern corporation. This paper discusses some important and difficult problems on ESO plan.By establishing and studying models, we draw the conclusion as follows: ESO prompts the benefit correspondent between managers and stockholders, help to solve the problem about long-term development, innovation, and manager choice of companies. Meanwhile, the incentive efficiency of ESO hinges on efficiency of stock and manager market, which is the limitation to ESO including the factors such as the macroeconomic condition and industry prospect.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
As incentive mechanism established for senior managers of companies, executive stock options aim to solve the agency problem in modern corporation. This paper discusses some important and difficult problems on ESO plan.By establishing and studying models, we draw the conclusion as follows: ESO prompts the benefit correspondent between managers and stockholders, help to solve the problem about long-term development, innovation, and manager choice of companies. Meanwhile, the incentive efficiency of ESO hinges on efficiency of stock and manager market, which is the limitation to ESO including the factors such as the macroeconomic condition and industry prospect.
Key concepts: Incentive, Corporation, Stock options, Shareholder, Business, Principal–agent problem, Stock (firearms), Stock market