Theory Of Cognitive Dissonance As It Pertains To Morality
Rachel D. Graham
Abstract
Rachel D. Graham
Abstract
Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance has not been adequately researched in its application to morality (i.e., a person may believe one way but act another). The present experiment sought to demonstrate the presence of cognitive dissonance after making a difficult decision concerning morality. The results are congruent with the literature, which indicates that people experience significant cognitive dissonance after making a difficult decision. Different types of moral dilemmas elicit differing levels of cognitive dissonance. The theory that a person may reduce cognitive dissonance by changing their thoughts or decisions was not supported by the results.
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Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance has not been adequately researched in its application to morality (i.e., a person may believe one way but act another). The present experiment sought to demonstrate the presence of cognitive dissonance after making a difficult decision concerning morality. The results are congruent with the literature, which indicates that people experience significant cognitive dissonance after making a difficult decision. Different types of moral dilemmas elicit differing levels of cognitive dissonance. The theory that a person may reduce cognitive dissonance by changing their thoughts or decisions was not supported by the results.
Key concepts: Cognitive dissonance, Self-justification, Self-perception theory, Morality, Psychology, Cognition, Social psychology, Cognitive psychology