Study on the Relationship between the Parent Company Shareholding,Subsidiary Management Power and Innovation Behavior——Empirical Data From China's High-Tech Listing Corporations

Parent and subsidiary company institution is one of the most important and complex modern enterprise system emerged after the socialized production reach a certain extent,and at present most business groups of our country take this organization form.In this organization,an important content of corporate governance is the power allocation of parent and subsidiary company,the rationality of power allocation of parent and subsidiary companies greatly influences the decision-making and the development trend of the subsidiaries,so make research of the influenced factors and effects of subsidiary management power allocation and arrangement plays an important role in enhancing the level of corporate governance and corporate performance.Based on the above analysis,the authors take the going-concern high-tech listing corporation as research samples,make empirical analysis on the relationship between the parent company shareholding,subsidiary management power and innovation behavior.And also they examine the regulation role of product market competition that in relationship between the subsidiary management power and innovation behavior.Compared with previous studies,the main contribution of this paper lies in:firstly,from the positive perspective,the authors study the positive influence of subsidiary management power applies on subsidiary innovation behaviors in the parent and subsidiaiy companies organization form;secondly,the authors face the agent cost and decision conflicts between the parent company and the subsidiaiy company management layer,and then study the reverse relationship between the parent company shareholding ratio and subsidiary company management power;thirdly,then the authors explore the regulatory effect of product market competition plays on the parent company shareholding ratio and subsidiary company management layer power,and analyzes,whether there are differences in constraint and control on subsidiaiy company management power of parent company with changes of product market competition degree.Through the empirical test of 1656 sets of data for four consecutive years then the authors draw the following conclusions:firstly,the higher the proportion of parent company shareholding is,the weaker the subsidiaiy management power will be;secondly,the higher the parent company shareholding proportion is,the less innovation behaviors subsidiaiy will have;thirdly,subsidiary management power has a positive role in promoting subsidiaiy innovation behavior;fourthly,subsidiaiy management power has a partial mediating role between the parent company shareholding and the subsidiaiy company innovation behavior.The parent company shareholding will have a stronger negative correlation of subsidiary company management power if the product market competition degree is higher,the degree of product market competition will weaken negative correlation that the parent company shareholding produce on subsidiaiy company management layer.Based on these research conclusions,we put forward the following policy suggestions for management practice of Chinese enterprises;first,we can reduce the parent company shareholding ratio within the group framework,and promote subsidiaiy equity diversification;second,we should establish the parent and subsidiaiy company power allocation standard and the parent subsidiaiy company executive association mechanism within framework of the group,reduce agency cost between the parent company and the subsidiaiy management layer;third,then we should construct risk evaluation system for innovation project of subsidiaiy company,and improve the decision-making mechanism subsidiaiy of innovation project.