Economic Logic of Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Concern
Xuliang Wu
Abstract
Xuliang Wu
Abstract
This article seeks to synthesize and extend existing theory on vertical restraints,with an emphasis on the private and social welfare effects of vertical restraints. It develops a practical framework for the economic analysis of vertical restraints,so as to identify the conditions where detrimental effects are likely to dominate benign social welfare effects,and vice versa. The results have some implications to Chinese ongoing antitrust legislation.
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This article seeks to synthesize and extend existing theory on vertical restraints,with an emphasis on the private and social welfare effects of vertical restraints. It develops a practical framework for the economic analysis of vertical restraints,so as to identify the conditions where detrimental effects are likely to dominate benign social welfare effects,and vice versa. The results have some implications to Chinese ongoing antitrust legislation.
Key concepts: Vertical restraints, Vertical integration, Economics, Welfare, Legislation, Public economics, Economic analysis, Social Welfare