The Theory Model of Fund Manager's Incentives on Relative Performance Contracts
Song Jia-sha
Abstract
Song Jia-sha
Abstract
Based on the studies of fund manager's relative performance merchanism,this paper builds a model containing three competitive fund managers to study fund manager's incentives on relative performance contracts,and recognizes that special relative performance contracts may cause unconventional investment decision orherd behavior. It suggests that the goverment should speed up the construction of scientific and reasonable evaluation system of fond managers,and provide a better external environment for the long-term development of the fund industry.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Based on the studies of fund manager's relative performance merchanism,this paper builds a model containing three competitive fund managers to study fund manager's incentives on relative performance contracts,and recognizes that special relative performance contracts may cause unconventional investment decision orherd behavior. It suggests that the goverment should speed up the construction of scientific and reasonable evaluation system of fond managers,and provide a better external environment for the long-term development of the fund industry.
Key concepts: Manager of managers fund, Incentive, Fund administration, Business, Target date fund, Investment management, Investment (military), Investment fund