The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Selection of the Equity Incentive Forms-Based on the Empirical Analysis of Chinese Capital Markets
Yong Ji
Abstract
Yong Ji
Abstract
This paper explores the effect of corporate governance on the selection of the equity incentive form using proxy theory and control right theory from an internal view.We suggest that corporate governance variables such as the percentage of managerial ownership,board structure,large shareholder,the CEO-chairman duality have a great effect on the selection of the equity incentive form and the economic consequence.Finally,we use the listed companies that have already carried out the equity incentive to test our hypothesis.
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This paper explores the effect of corporate governance on the selection of the equity incentive form using proxy theory and control right theory from an internal view.We suggest that corporate governance variables such as the percentage of managerial ownership,board structure,large shareholder,the CEO-chairman duality have a great effect on the selection of the equity incentive form and the economic consequence.Finally,we use the listed companies that have already carried out the equity incentive to test our hypothesis.
Key concepts: Corporate governance, Incentive, Equity (law), Shareholder, Business, Equity capital markets, Proxy (statistics), Accounting